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ABSTRACT: This paper examines Jason Stanley’s account of propaganda. I begin with an overview and some ques-
tions about the structure of that account. I then argue for two main conclusions. First, I argue that Stanley’s 
account over-generalizes, by counting mere incompetent argumentation as propaganda. But this problem can 
be avoided, by emphasizing the role of emotions in effective propaganda more than Stanley does. In addition, 
I argue that more propaganda is democratically acceptable than Stanley allows. Focusing especially on sexual 
assault prevention campaigns, I show that propaganda can be acceptable even when it represents some in our 
communities as worthy of contempt.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo examina la teoría de la propaganda de Jason Stanley. Comienzo con una visión general y algu-
nas cuestiones relativas a la estructura de esta teoría. A continuación, argumento en apoyo de dos conclusions 
principales. En primer lugar, argumento que la teoría de Stanley sobre-generaliza, al considerar como propa-
ganda lo que es mera argumentación incompetente. Pero este problema puede evitarse si se enfatiza el papel de 
las emociones en la propaganda efectiva más de lo que Stanley lo permite. Adicionalmente, argumento que hay 
más propaganda democráticamente acceptable de la que Stanley permite. Centrándome en especial en las cam-
pañas de prevención contra la violencia sexual, muestro que la propaganda puede ser acceptable incluso cuando 
presenta a algunos miembros de nuestra comunidad como merecedores de desprecio.
Palabras clave: propaganda, retórica cívica, ideología, desigualdad, incompetencia.
1. Introduction
What is propaganda? How does it function? And when, and why, should we be concerned 
about its prevalence? These are just some of the questions that Jason Stanley tackles in 
his highly engaging new book, How Propaganda Works. This rich and wide-ranging work 
sounds a trenchant warning about the dangers of propaganda in liberal democracies, argu-
ing that some kinds of propaganda pose an “existential threat” (11) to such societies.1
* Many thanks to Jason Stanley, Eric Swanson, Agustin Vicente, Brian Weatherson, and an audience at 
the American Philosophical Association’s 2016 Pacific Division Meeting for helpful comments and 
discussion about the material covered in this paper.
1 Page numbers in parentheses refer to Stanley (2015).
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Stanley argues that much propaganda is deeply harmful. On his view, “harmful propa-
ganda relies upon the existence of flawed ideologies present in a given society” (4). More 
specifically, the kind of propaganda in which Stanley is interested —what he calls ‘dema-
goguery’— exploits flawed ideologies, and at the same time, strengthens them. These flawed 
ideologies, in turn, keep us from understanding the true nature of our social reality, and so 
degrade democratic deliberation. Thus, by helping to perpetuate flawed ideologies, propa-
ganda threatens to undermine the very possibility of democracy.
Intriguingly, though, Stanley does not think that all propaganda is harmful in the man-
ner just described. Rather, some propaganda —what he labels ‘civic rhetoric’— can be posi-
tively beneficial, for it can help repair flawed ideologies. In so doing, civic rhetoric can in 
fact restore the possibility of democratic deliberation. Nevertheless, while acknowledging 
this possibility, Stanley also expresses broad discomfort with the idea of using propaganda 
to achieve any goal, no matter how worthy, in a democratic society.
Stanley’s book is essential reading for those interested in harmful speech, democratic 
legitimacy, and ideology, among several related topics. In light of rising tides of hatred and 
xenophobia around the world, it’s hard to imagine a more appropriate time to be discuss-
ing the questions raised here. The book is also remarkable in the way that it builds upon 
work from a disparate array of subfields within philosophy (including political philosophy, 
of course, but also philosophy of language, epistemology, feminist philosophy, philosophy 
of race, and more) as well as from neighboring fields like psychology and political science. 
It is a model for how ideas and tools from quite separate-seeming domains can be pulled to-
gether to address questions of broad public concern.
This paper will focus on two aspects of the book. The first is Stanley’s view of what 
propaganda is (Chapters 2 and 3). I’ll argue that his view over-generalizes in a crucial way, 
by counting as propaganda what should in fact be regarded as mere incompetence. I’ll then 
consider some possible responses to this problem. A second aspect of the book that I’ll also 
focus on is Stanley’s account of when propaganda is permissible in a democratic society 
(Chapter 3). I’ll argue that this account is far too restrictive, that propaganda has vital posi-
tive roles to play that go well beyond what Stanley allows.2
My discussion in this paper will largely be concerned with the first few chapters of the 
book. This means that I’ll be leaving aside quite a lot that is of interest here. For example, I 
won’t touch on Stanley’s claim that the familiar distinction between at-issue and not-at-issue 
content can help us get a grip on how certain kinds of propaganda work (Chapter 4); and I’ll 
only briefly discuss his argument that substantive inequalities of many kinds are democrati-
cally problematic because they allow harmful propaganda to flourish (Chapter 6).3 The pa-
per thus makes no claim to covering all that is important (or controversial!) in the book.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section (§2), I start with a brief overview 
of some of Stanley’s main arguments. This overview will allow me to raise some questions 
about how those arguments fit together, and will also set up the discussion in the remain-
der of the paper. Sections 3 and 4 focus on Stanley’s account of propaganda, specifically, 
2 For some, the word ‘propaganda’ is a (strong) pejorative, so my talk of positive propaganda will seem 
nearly incoherent. For those readers, the interesting question is about civic rhetoric, specifically, about 
which representations should count as civic rhetoric, rather than propaganda.
3 See Swanson (forthcoming) for a very helpful discussion of the former claim, and Srinivasan (2016) for 
a rich commentary on the latter argument.
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his distinction between two kinds of propaganda. In §3, I describe some virtues of that ac-
count, but also argue that the account over-generalizes. In §4, I explore one way out of this 
problem of over-generalization, that I think (and will argue) is independently attractive. 
Next, in §5, I turn to Stanley’s view of civic rhetoric, and argue that it leaves out some prop-
aganda that performs essential functions in societies like ours. Finally, in §6, I briefly wrap 
up by emphasizing a theme that runs through my discussion.
2. An overview
As for any other notion, several distinct accounts of propaganda may be viable. Some may 
hew closely to the ordinary sense(s) of the word, while others might diverge from those or-
dinary sense(s) in order to better serve our theoretical purposes. (For discussion of the dif-
ferent kinds of projects theorists may engage in when theorizing about some notion, see 
Haslanger 2006 as well as other essays in her 2012.)
Stanley prefaces his account of propaganda with several examples of the phenomenon, 
including some from Victor Klemperer’s landmark study The Language of the Third Reich. 
Of these examples, Stanley writes:
What emerges is the idea that demagogic contributions employ, whether intentionally or un-
intentionally, flawed ideologies to cut off rational deliberation and discussion. In characteristic 
cases, they do so by using the flawed ideologies to overwhelm affective states (47, emphasis added).
Stanley then distinguishes two accounts of propaganda that, though different from his pre-
ferred account, nonetheless attempt to capture something like the idea described in the pas-
sage above. The first of these —what he labels ‘the classical sense of propaganda’— focuses 
on the use of propaganda to move people, or the state, to action. Typically, this is done by 
riling up emotions in a way that puts an end to rational debate. On this view, propaganda 
is “manipulation of the rational will to close off debate” (48, emphasis removed).4 A second 
account of propaganda —‘propaganda as biased speech’, which Stanley attributes to Noam 
Chomsky— is less concerned with its role in producing action, and more with its role in 
structuring debate. On this view, propaganda is “speech that irrationally closes off certain 
options that should be considered” (49). Though these accounts are clearly different, they 
are united in taking propaganda to be opposed to rational debate (and action).
Stanley’s preferred account echoes that last sentiment. He distinguishes two kinds of 
propaganda, characterized thus:
Supporting Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodi-
ment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideals by 
either emotional or other nonrational means (53).
Undermining Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodi-
ment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals (53).
Propaganda of both kinds thus exemplifies, or embodies, certain ideals; these include po-
litical ideals, but also rational, scientific, economic, and other ideals. The two kinds then 
4 I’ll have a bit more to say about this conception in §4.
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differ with respect to the effect they have on those ideals. As the label suggests, supporting 
propaganda tends to uphold those ideals; but it does so by “emotional or other nonrational 
means”. Undermining propaganda, by contrast, needn’t work via non-rational means. But 
the success of undermining propaganda requires a different kind of failure of rationality, 
namely, the failure to notice the tension —or “a kind of contradiction” (53)— between the 
presented ideals and the effects of the propaganda.
Stanley offers a catalog of examples to illustrate both kinds of propaganda. But his pri-
mary interest is in the second kind, namely, undermining propaganda. A particularly strik-
ing illustration of this kind involves Ben Bernanke’s use of the phrase ‘fiscal cliff’ in early 
2012 (83-86).5 Bernanke, then chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, was discussing the 
possible consequences of two actions being contemplated by the U.S. Congress at the time: 
first, the ending of the tax cuts enacted during George W. Bush’s presidency, and second, 
the triggering of the large spending cuts in the so-called ‘sequester’. Bernanke was, quite 
understandably, concerned that going over the cliff —i.e., allowing the tax rates to rise and 
the spending cuts to take effect— would result in a great deal of liquidity being rapidly 
taken out of the U.S. economy while it was still weak. But instead of explaining this con-
cern clearly, he exploited the public’s confusion about economics in general, and deficits in 
particular, to give the false impression that going over the cliff would significantly raise the 
deficit. Bernanke’s remarks thus “eroded democratic ideals” (85) while appearing to up-
hold them, by playing on fear of deficits and reinforcing false beliefs about the economy. 
This, in turn, made future rational debate on these topics that much harder to achieve. Or 
so Stanley argues.
(Stanley’s discussion of this, and other, examples raises a worry about what precisely 
he means by “embodiment” of ideals. Presumably, an intention to uphold certain ideals, or 
even to appear as though one is upholding them, can’t be required; Bernanke quite plausi-
bly had no specific intentions about democratic ideals at all when making his comments. 
What then makes it the case that Bernanke was embodying these ideals? Is the fact that he 
was making a contribution to public discourse in his official governmental role enough? 
Did the content of his contribution matter? Would an ordinary citizen’s contribution to 
public discourse in a democracy also so count?)
The Bernanke example is also meant to illustrate the role that flawed ideological beliefs 
play in enabling propaganda. For Stanley, ideological beliefs in general are beliefs that are 
resistant to rational revision in response to evidence (178-179). But he doesn’t think that 
all such beliefs are epistemologically defective; some ideological beliefs can even constitute 
knowledge. Flawed ideological beliefs, in Stanley’s sense, are epistemologically defective, in 
that their presence “hinders the acquisition of knowledge” (199). Opportunistic fear-mon-
gering about deficits by both major political parties in the U.S. has given rise to flawed ide-
ological beliefs about deficits. And those are the beliefs, Stanley suggests, that allow Bernan-
ke’s talk of fiscal cliffs to do its work.
In the final chapters of the book (particularly Chapters 5 and 6), Stanley draws to-
gether the elements described thus far to argue for a further noteworthy conclusion, 
5 Stanley also discusses this example in an earlier piece (Stanley 2013). I’ll return to this example repeat-
edly throughout this paper. I focus on this example largely because Stanley discusses it in quite a bit of 
detail.
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namely, that inequalities —specifically, “substantive material, social, and economic inequal-
ities” (216)— are democratically problematic. That’s because these inequalities tend to en-
able certain flawed ideological beliefs to flourish, particularly those beliefs that are needed 
to make the inequalities appear legitimate. These flawed ideological beliefs, in turn, allow 
harmful propaganda to be effective. And harmful propaganda is antithetical to the kind of 
rational debate that is crucial for a democracy. So, the argument concludes, inequalities of 
these kinds are bad for democratic societies. Call this Stanley’s ‘inequality argument’ (see 
180-181 for a useful overview).
There is much to say about this intriguing argument, but I won’t attempt an in-depth 
assessment here. Rather, I’ll close my overview by raising a pair of (related) questions about 
the overall dialectic of the book.
To begin, recall that on Stanley’s view, harmful propaganda both exploits and strength-
ens flawed ideologies. That raises the first question: what does it mean to say that propa-
ganda strengthens flawed ideologies? Stanley’s discussion helps to illuminate how propa-
ganda exploits flawed ideologies. But less is said about how it strengthens these ideologies.
In his discussion of the Bernanke case, for instance, Stanley writes that Bernanke’s use 
of ‘fiscal cliff’ “reinforced the public’s false beliefs about economics” (85). He adds:
[In relying upon flawed ideological beliefs about the economy] Bernanke thus set the stage 
for the subsequent irrational public deliberation that preceded the debt ceiling crisis in 2013. 
… Flawed ideological beliefs corrode rational debate. In a healthy democracy, the goal of a pub-
lic official should be to dissolve them, rather than rely on them. Relying upon them only strength-
ens them and makes them much more problematic barriers in subsequent debate (86, emphasis 
added).
This passage suggests a very close connection between exploiting certain beliefs, and 
strengthening them: perhaps the thought is that whenever flawed ideological beliefs are 
exploited —especially by those in positions of authority— they are thereby strengthened. 
But that seems too strong a link. Suppose a professor knows that her students believe she 
never grants extensions; she says to them, “Final papers are due on April 30”, knowing that 
she can exploit those false beliefs to get papers in by that date and no later. It’s hard to see 
in what sense this exploitation can be said to strengthen the relevant beliefs. The profes-
sor’s behavior provides no new evidence in favor of those beliefs; nor does it make it harder 
for the students to consider alternative possibilities than previously. Instead, the exploita-
tion here largely leaves those beliefs as before. Whatever strengthening amounts to, then, 
it should not be tied too closely to exploitation; not every instance of exploiting a belief 
strengthens it in any interesting sense.6
My second question focuses on Stanley’s inequality argument. The question is this: 
how crucial is propaganda to this argument? Recall that that argument is intended to es-
tablish that inequalities of many kinds are democratically problematic. And it does so by 
6 It’s compatible with what I’ve just said that Bernanke missed an important opportunity to clear up 
public confusion, and in so doing, failed in his role as a public official. Stanley points to this failure in 
the passage quoted above. But even if that’s right, that only suggests that Bernanke is personally criti-
cizable, perhaps even blameworthy, for his contribution. Not much follows, I think, about whether his 
alleged failure strengthened the ideologies in question.
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pointing to a link between those inequalities and flawed ideological beliefs, and a further 
link between those beliefs and propaganda. But we might ask whether Stanley has the re-
sources to make a simpler argument for the same conclusion, one that doesn’t rely on the 
second link all. According to this simpler argument, inequalities are democratically prob-
lematic because the flawed ideological beliefs they enable are themselves democratically 
problematic. After all, for Stanley, flawed ideological beliefs interfere with the acquisition 
of knowledge, including knowledge about the injustices being committed in our communi-
ties. Such beliefs keep us from understanding the true nature of our social reality, and relat-
edly, from correctly identifying our own interests. They therefore pose a serious challenge 
for democratic deliberation, and so, are bad for democratic societies.
The argumentative strategy outlined above aims to show that flawed ideological beliefs 
are democratically problematic without ever appealing to propaganda. Of course, I’ve only 
sketched that strategy here; many details would have to be filled in to make the argument 
work. But as I understand him, Stanley is committed to everything said above about how 
flawed ideological beliefs work, and defends these commitments in the final chapters of his 
book. That means that he is in a position to offer the simpler argument described above, 
which makes no claims about the nature of propaganda. To put it another way, Stanley has 
the resources to construct an argument that’s at least as strong as his (original) inequality 
argument, without drawing on any of the material in the four chapters of his book.
The two questions I’ve raised are related in that an answer to the first question may 
help shed light on the second. That is, a fuller account of how propaganda strengthens 
flawed ideologies (as called for by the first question) may help explain why propaganda 
makes those ideologies even more democratically problematic than they would be other-
wise. And that, in turn, may explain why the simpler argument sketched above —even if 
sound— fails to capture the full extent of the challenge posed by flawed ideologies to dem-
ocratic societies.
This completes my overview of Stanley’s arguments. As I mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, this is by no means comprehensive; but it should suffice to make clear the sheer ambi-
tion of Stanley’s work. In the remainder of the paper, I’ll home in on some parts of Stanley’s 
account, beginning with his view of what propaganda is.
3. Propaganda and incompetence
Stanley’s conception of propaganda —of both the supporting and undermining kinds— is 
broad in at least two ways: on his view, propaganda need neither be false nor insincerely ut-
tered (Chapter 2). To illustrate this point, he imagines a non-Muslim politician in the U.S. 
saying to his audience, “there are Muslims among us” (42). The politician, we can stipu-
late, intends this as a kind of warning, and means to stoke fear of Muslim Americans. But 
what he says here is true, and may be sincerely uttered. The politician may even believe that 
fear is a fitting reaction to Muslim Americans and other Muslims in the U.S. Nevertheless, 
Stanley thinks that this utterance should count as propaganda. If so, the falsity and insin-
cerity conditions on propaganda must be jettisoned.
One response to this argument would be to insist that, while propaganda doesn’t have 
to say something false, it must at least communicate something false. That might give us a 
modified falsity condition: in order for something to be propaganda, it must convey some-
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thing false, whether explicitly or not.7 Stanley considers this response, and offers several 
reasons to reject it (42-43). Among these is the following point:
[T]here is a perfectly natural way of thinking of the effects of propaganda according to which 
it can involve the expression of truths and the communication of emotions. If emotions are not 
true or false, then propaganda need not be false. In fact, the case of “there are Muslims among us,” 
used to elicit a fear of Muslims, is a case of exactly this structure (43).
Here, as elsewhere, Stanley emphasizes the role of emotions in effective propaganda. A de-
fender of the spirit (if not the letter) of the falsity condition can still try to salvage some-
thing here, perhaps by noting that emotions can be fitting or unfitting. But Stanley is surely 
right to emphasize that the conveying of false contents needn’t play any crucial role in 
propaganda.
So far, so good. But one consequence of giving up both the falsity and insincerity con-
ditions on propaganda is that quite a lot may end up counting as propaganda. In particular, 
contributions to public discourse that are sincerely intended to uphold political, scientific, 
or other ideals, but that end up backfiring against those ideals —perhaps due to the incom-
petence of the contributor— will sometimes qualify as undermining propaganda.
Here’s one (somewhat fictional) example to illustrate this point. Imagine a politician 
who genuinely wishes to use the best social scientific research to inform his political views, 
but happens to be not very good at deciphering said research. This politician reads an influ-
ential economist’s report that nearly 98% of the net increase in wages and benefits due to 
immigration goes to the immigrants themselves (Yglesias 2015, reporting on the work of 
“immigration-skeptical” economist George Borjas). Failing to recognize that this figure im-
plies that immigration increases wages and benefits for non-immigrants as well, though by 
a smaller margin, the politician proceeds to use this research to argue for a drastic reduction 
in immigration (“Economists have shown that immigration takes away wages from you, 
the American worker…”). The view begins to take hold, and becomes an increasingly in-
fluential talking point against the free flow of immigration. Those who understand what is 
happening come to conclude that social scientific research can be twisted to serve any end 
whatsoever. Through his incompetence, the politician thus ends up subverting the very ide-
als —about the value of scientific research to policymaking— that he intended to uphold. 
Call this the ‘incompetent politician’ case.
This case is one example of bad political argumentation; but of course, it’s not hard 
to come up with many more. But when bad arguments end up rebounding against the 
sometimes worthy ideals they are meant to serve, they look like undermining propaganda 
in Stanley’s sense. (In fact, the same can be said about good political argumentation, but I 
won’t pursue that point here.)
Interestingly, Stanley’s Bernanke case may give us a further example of political argu-
mentation backfiring. In his discussion of that case, Stanley supposes that Bernanke was 
“well aware that his warning would be misunderstood [as a warning about a potentially cat-
astrophic increase to the deficit], and that the misunderstanding would lead to its effective-
7 An analogous move can be made with respect to sincerity as well, though in my view, the move is 
(even) less plausible in the latter case.
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ness” (84). But as Stanley also admits, that’s mere speculation.8 A different reading of the 
case would see it as one of incompetence: Bernanke used a phrase that confused his public, 
contrary to his intentions. Understood this way, this is an example in which Bernanke em-
bodies democratic ideals, just as Stanley suggests, but what he says (accidentally) ends up 
backfiring against those ideals.
As mentioned earlier, it may be that several distinct accounts of propaganda are viable; 
perhaps different accounts will be needed to do different kinds of theoretical work. Never-
theless, any account of propaganda that counts all instances of political discourse eroding 
the ideals they embody via the incompetence of the contributor, or the audience, or both, 
will surely end up making that category unacceptably broad. For one thing, such a broad ac-
count would blur important distinctions about what needs to be done to ameliorate the ef-
fects of propaganda, since eroding of ideals via incompetence presumably calls for rather 
different remedies than eroding of ideals via flawed ideologies.
Let me briefly address two possible responses to what I’ve argued thus far. The first re-
sponse seeks to exclude examples like the incompetent politician case on the grounds that 
they don’t involve flawed ideologies. According to this response, even if the politician’s 
contribution does undermine the ideals in question, that undermining doesn’t happen via 
the exploitation of flawed ideological beliefs. So, according to this response, that isn’t an 
instance of (undermining) propaganda. (By contrast, since the Bernanke case does involve 
flawed ideological beliefs, that would still count as propaganda.)
But this response is not successful, for two reasons. First, note that Stanley’s charac-
terization of the two kinds of propaganda (quoted in §2) doesn’t include any mention of 
flawed ideological beliefs. That is, as I understand him, Stanley is committed to the view 
that the operation of propaganda will typically involve flawed ideologies, but this isn’t defi-
nitional; for him, it is not a necessary condition for something’s being propaganda that it 
operate in this way. Second, and more importantly, the response described above only suc-
ceeds in pushing the issue further back. Recall that for Stanley, flawed ideological beliefs are 
ones that are resistant to rational revision, and that hinder the acquisition of knowledge. 
But one significant source of resistance to rational revision is sheer incompetence: if, for ex-
ample, an agent has difficulty with numerical reasoning, his numerical beliefs may be highly 
resistant to rational revision, due to his incompetence in the domain. And these beliefs may 
well prevent him from coming to know things. But we would not want to say that these are 
flawed ideological beliefs. So the issue raised by the incompetent politician case remains to 
be solved.
A different response to my argument focuses on the ‘tends to’ locution that appears in 
both of Stanley’s notions of propaganda. To say that something, X, tends to produce some 
effect E need not be to say that X always produces E; it may be that X only produces E 
when certain background conditions C are in place. And once that has been noted, the the-
orist has room to specify which background conditions are relevant to the analysis. With 
respect to the issue at hand, we can agree that contributions to public discourse can erode 
ideals either due to the incompetence of the contributor (and/or audience), or due to their 
flawed ideological beliefs; but, according to the current response, the former is a more ac-
8 Further, given Stanley’s own rejection of the insincerity condition on propaganda, it is not clear why 
Bernanke’s beliefs/intentions should matter. 
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cidental, or shallower, feature of reality, than the latter. To put it another way, erosion of 
ideals due to flawed ideological beliefs will persist across a wider range of background con-
ditions —be harder to remedy, perhaps— than erosion of ideals due to incompetence. And 
that difference can be marked in our understanding of the ‘tends to’ locution, and so, in 
our understanding of propaganda.9
I think this response is much harder to counter than the previous one. And it’s not one 
that I can do justice to here. But very briefly, let me say that I’m not optimistic about the 
idea that incompetence is a less robust, or shallower, feature of reality than flawed ideology. 
At the very least, I suspect that the former is, in practice, no easier to ameliorate than the 
latter. But this is, in the end, an empirical issue, and a tricky one at that, for it will often be 
hard to tell whether it is incompetence, flawed ideology, or some mutually reinforcing com-
bination of the two that is at work in a given case. As such, this issue is not something that 
can be settled here.
4. Non-rational means
In this section, I’ll explore a further response to the worries raised in the previous one. But 
as I’ll also show, the view explored here has merit regardless of whether it succeeds in re-
solving those particular worries.
Recall that I argued in the last section that Stanley’s account over-generalizes, for exam-
ples like the incompetent politician case should not count as (undermining) propaganda. 
One way to get the right results in such cases would be to revise Stanley’s characterization 
as follows:
Undermining Propaganda (Revised): A contribution to public discourse that is presented as 
an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals by either 
emotional or other nonrational means.
The idea here is that undermining propaganda not only subverts certain ideals, as in 
Stanley’s original characterization, but that it does so in a particular way, i.e., via non-ra-
tional means. The revision brings undermining propaganda more in line with Stanley’s 
conception of supporting propaganda:
Supporting Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodi-
ment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideals by 
either emotional or other nonrational means (53).
The resulting view is perhaps closer to the classical sense of propaganda (discussed in §2) 
—according to which propaganda is “manipulation of the rational will to close off debate” 
(48, emphasis removed)— than Stanley’s own account is.
The revised proposal is in keeping with much of what Stanley says about propaganda 
generally: for example, that it “short-circuits” rationality (11), that it “bypasses rational de-
9 This response is based on a suggestion made by Stanley in his remarks at a session on his book at the 
Pacific APA. But I may not be fully capturing that suggestion here.
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liberation” (12), that it operates to “cut off rational deliberation and discussion”, charac-
teristically by “overwhelm[ing] affective states” (47), that it involves “a kind of manipula-
tion of rational beings toward an end without engaging their rational will” (58), and so on. 
These characterizations are not equivalent —short-circuiting something is arguably differ-
ent from bypassing it altogether, for instance— but they all point towards the thought that 
propaganda does its work through non-rational means.
This line of thinking also fits well with the examples of propaganda discussed already. 
Consider first the (fictional) example of the politician saying, “there are Muslims among 
us.” As Stanley suggests, that utterance can be thought of as playing upon (irrational) fear 
of Muslims, exploiting that fear to move the audience to action, or at least to the voting 
booth. Much the same can be said about the Bernanke case. There too the speech plays 
upon (irrational) fear, or perhaps anxiety, this time about deficits. In both cases, the effec-
tiveness of the propaganda depends upon the presence of that fear and anxiety.
The revision suggested above has further advantages. For one thing, it does away with 
the (otherwise puzzling) asymmetry between Stanley’s two notions of propaganda. And it 
can capture why the incompetent politician’s contribution doesn’t count as propaganda. 
The politician puts forth an argument for his conclusion, namely, that immigration should 
be further restricted. But because he has misunderstood the underlying research, it’s a terri-
ble argument. Nevertheless, the politician is genuinely attempting to rationally persuade his 
audience. And that’s also how his contribution is regarded by his audience. Therefore, there 
is a clear sense in which he is employing rational means, though in a sub-optimal way.
At the same time, the suggested revision would bring some costs for Stanley, for it would 
exclude some of his examples of propaganda. Consider, for instance, climate change denial. 
Stanley suggests that some deniers present themselves as exemplifying the highest ideals of 
scientific objectivity, while undermining those very ideals by exaggerating the uncertainty 
involved in climate science, cherrypicking certain bits of evidence and ignoring others, and 
so on (60). While this is undoubtedly problematic, some of this kind of denial doesn’t seek 
to bypass rational deliberation, or to act via non-rational means more generally. Rather, it 
seeks to influence the outputs of rational deliberation by emphasizing certain parts of the ev-
idence, and occluding other parts. As such, this kind of climate change denial doesn’t count 
as undermining propaganda, according to the revision under consideration here.
This is the right result. One way to see this is to note the similarity between this kind 
of climate change denial and the incompetent politician case discussed earlier. The main 
difference between the cases is the presence (or not) of deceptive intentions on the part of 
the speaker(s). But Stanley’s original characterization of propaganda, as well as his argu-
ments against the falsity and insincerity conditions (discussed in §3), suggest that the pres-
ence of intentions of this type doesn’t matter to whether some contribution is propaganda. 
That seems to me an attractive view. In keeping with that view, we should treat this kind of 
denial like the incompetent politician’s contribution, i.e., as not propaganda.
(Of course, plenty of climate change denial would still count as undermining propa-
ganda even on the revised proposal. Insofar as much climate change denial erodes scientific 
ideals by playing on group identity, particularly strong affiliation with a political party, it 
exploits flawed ideology in just the way that Stanley describes (181-183).)
To make the revised proposal work —as well as to flesh out Stanley’s own account of 
supporting propaganda— more needs to be said about what counts as “emotional or other 
nonrational means” for these purposes. To demonstrate why, I’ll look at a further pair of 
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cases, in which contributions to public discourse are designed to appeal to our affective 
states. (Both examples are candidates for being supporting propaganda; but I assume that, 
in light of the revision, the “emotional or other nonrational means” qualifier is to be under-
stood the same way in both notions.)
First, consider an advertising campaign that seeks to deter drinking and driving by 
drawing attention to the steep human cost of this behavior. An ad in this campaign shows a 
mother picking the broken body of her young daughter off a road, following a crash caused 
by a drunk driver.10 Second, consider newspaper photographs of victims in the aftermath of 
a terrorist action, such as the photograph of the two bloodied women survivors that circu-
lated widely after the recent bombing in Brussels (Khomami 2016).
Images like these do two things. First, they invite viewers to feel empathy for the vic-
tims, to share in their suffering. But equally, they invite viewers to feel contempt for the 
perpetrators of the suffering, to regard them as something like moral monsters. (This is 
particularly clear in many of the ads in the ‘Everyone hurts’ campaign. Several of these de-
pict the drivers as selfish and thoughtless, caring more about their own fleeting pleasures 
than the wellbeing of others (TACVictoria 2009).) By doing these things, these images 
seek to motivate us to be different from the perpetrators, and perhaps to share in the effort 
of bringing the perpetrators to justice.
In light of these observations, we can ask: do these images count as (supporting) propa-
ganda, on Stanley’s view? They are clearly contributions to public discourse that attempt to 
realize certain ideals, e.g., ideals of health, safety, political solidarity, and so on; and they do 
so by appealing strongly to our emotions. In fact, they arguably aim to overwhelm us emo-
tionally, and thus motivate us to act while “bypassing” rational deliberation. So that’s some 
reason to think they should count as propaganda.
At the same time, as Stanley recognizes, not every appeal to emotions is non-rational. 
Emotions can be perfectly rational: for example, it is be rational for me to be afraid of 
snakes, and it is also rational for me to feel affection for the city of San Francisco. Along 
these lines, Stanley writes:
Propaganda is not simply closing off rational debate by appeal to emotion; often, emotions 
are rational and track reasons. It rather involves closing off debate by “emotions detached from 
their ideas.” … [P]ropaganda closes off debate by bypassing the rational will. It makes the state 
move as one, stirred by emotions that far surpass the evidence for their intensity (48, emphasis added 
in final sentence).11
Here’s a view suggested by this passage: we could say that a contribution to public discourse 
that acts via emotional means qualifies as propaganda only if the emotions it exploits/
10 The image I have in mind is part of the ‘Everybody hurts’ advertising campaign from the Transport 
Accident Commission (TAC) of the state of Victoria in Australia. That image, among many others, is 
included in their 20 year campaign retrospective (TACVictoria 2009). This campaign produced a se-
ries of particularly emotionally wrenching images, but broadly similar campaigns have been mounted 
by other sources. 
11 In this passage, Stanley is discussing the classical sense of propaganda, which (as mentioned in §2), is 
distinct from his preferred view. But what he says here suggests resources for interpreting both his view 
of supporting propaganda and the revised proposal for undermining propaganda.
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evokes are stronger than what is warranted by the facts. (I say ‘the facts’ rather than ‘the 
evidence’ so as to avoid questions about whose evidence.) On this view, whether the im-
ages described earlier constitute propaganda depends on whether the contempt they play 
upon fits the facts; if that contempt is warranted, then the images are not propaganda. Sim-
ilarly, whether Bernanke’s remarks about the fiscal cliff constitute propaganda depends on 
whether the fear (of deficits) they play upon is warranted. If, as some economists have ar-
gued, that fear is significantly overblown, those remarks may well count as propaganda, just 
as Stanley suggests.
Of course, whether some emotions do fit (or fail to fit) the facts is often a really hard 
question. So the resulting account of propaganda won’t always be easy to apply. And there 
are alternate ways of interpreting the “emotions or other nonrational means” qualifier that 
are also worth examining. But some such interpretation will be needed to flesh out both 
Stanley’s view of supporting propaganda, as well as my revised proposal regarding under-
mining propaganda.
5. Civic rhetoric
Having now spent some time on Stanley’s conception of propaganda, I turn in this final 
section to his view of propaganda that is democratically acceptable, i.e., of civic rhetoric. 
Merely aiming at —or even achieving— a praiseworthy goal is not enough to make prop-
aganda democratically legitimate, for Stanley: the Bernanke case, for instance, is one in 
which the propagandist has laudable aims, but the propaganda still undermines democratic 
ideals in an unacceptable way.
To get at Stanley’s view of when propaganda does constitute civic rhetoric, it will help 
to begin with his discussion of the (Rawlsian) norm of reasonableness, understood as an 
ideal for public discourse within a democracy (Chapters 3-4). To be reasonable in this 
sense “is to take one’s proposals to be accountable to everyone in the community” (108). 
Since others in the community may have very different perspectives from one’s own, this 
will involve taking into account those differing perspectives. Stanley argues that empathy, 
or “the capacity to put oneself in another’s shoes” (108, emphasis removed), is crucial to 
taking others’ perspectives into account, and so, to the realization of reasonableness.
Of course, public discourse in most actual democracies is not fully reasonable in this 
sense. Instead, in such societies, the perspectives of some have been systematically ex-
cluded, to the point of being rendered invisible to those in power. As a result, the pow-
erful don’t take themselves to be accountable to the excluded members. To rectify this, 
Stanley writes:
What is required is extending the domain of cognitive empathy to include those citizens, and 
there is no obvious cogent argument, from the perspective of just those citizens who are included 
in the sphere of liberal democratic ideals, to do so (116).
Where rational persuasion will not work, propaganda becomes the only means for bring-
ing those whose perspectives have previously been excluded into the political community, 
and thereby increasing the reasonableness of the ensuing debate. This is what civic rhetoric 
does. Stanley points to passages from Fannie Barrier Williams’ essay “The woman’s part in 
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a man’s business” (112-113) and W.E.B. Du Bois’ The Souls of Black Folk (116) as examples 
of propaganda of this kind.
In my view, Stanley is right to emphasize the dangers of propaganda, even when used 
for worthy ends. But the view sketched above sets a very high bar for civic rhetoric, in two 
ways. First, it suggests that propaganda is democratically acceptable only when other (ra-
tional) means for repairing flawed ideologies —specifically, ideologies that unfairly exclude 
some from the political community— are doomed to failure. Second, it also suggests that 
civic rhetoric must extend empathy to those whose perspectives had previously been ex-
cluded; at the very least, it should never seek to decrease empathy for others in our political 
community. As I’ll argue below, both claims are questionable.
To see why, consider another series of images, this time those used in the ‘Don’t be 
that guy’ campaign against sexual assault that began in Canada (Battered Women’s Sup-
port Services n.d., Women Against Violence Against Women n.d.). Like some others, this 
campaign seeks to educate its audience about what constitutes sexual assault. What’s dis-
tinctive about this particular campaign, though, is that its primary target audience is men, 
specifically, young men. As the campaign founders explain:
We are sending a visual message to men between the ages of 18 and 25, graphically demon-
strating their role in ending alcohol facilitated sexual assaults. Don’t Be That Guy shifts the em-
phasis to men to take responsibility for their behaviour. Studies involving 18-25 year old men re-
vealed that 48 per cent of the men did not consider it rape if a woman is too drunk to know what 
is going on (Battered Women’s Support Services n.d.).
One image in this campaign depicts an intoxicated and stumbling woman being helped 
into a car by a man; at the bottom of the image we see the tagline, ‘Just because you help 
her home… doesn’t mean you get to help yourself.’
The ‘Don’t be that guy’ campaign does two main things. First, it argues that having sex 
with someone who is too drunk to consent is unambiguously sexual assault, that there is no 
gray area on that question. Second, the campaign also tries to attach a kind of stigma to an-
yone who would have sex with a drunk woman; that’s the point of the ‘that guy’ label.
Let’s assume here, as I think is plausible, that the images in this campaign are propagan-
da.12 Given that, they are clearly democratically acceptable propaganda. Indeed, they serve 
a crucial function, insofar as they educate us about the seriousness of sexual assault, that it 
cannot be dismissed as merely a ‘regrettable’ mistake that young people are prone to make.
Nevertheless, these images fail to satisfy either of Stanley’s conditions on civic rheto-
ric mentioned above. First, it’s certainly possible that other (rational) means for repairing 
the flawed ideologies in question —ones which fail to take sexual assault seriously, that fail 
to respect the perspectives of survivors— would succeed, at least eventually. We have, after 
all, made some progress with respect to thinking, and talking, about sexual assault. But re-
gardless of that possibility, the ‘Don’t be that guy’ campaign seems also worth trying. The 
problem of sexual assault is urgent enough, and multifaceted enough, to justify multiple ap-
proaches, including this one. The availability of other (rational) means for repairing the 
ideologies in question seems irrelevant to the democratic acceptability of this campaign.
12 The points I will make below about this campaign also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the ‘Everybody 
hurts’ campaign discussed in the previous section. 
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Second, and more importantly, the ‘Don’t be that guy campaign’ not only fails to ex-
tend empathy to its targets, namely, perpetrators of sexual assault as well as those who 
just don’t “consider it rape if a woman is too drunk to know what is going on”; it in fact 
seeks to decrease our empathy for them. As mentioned above, the campaign seeks to stig-
matize these individuals for their actions (or attitudes). Though this is open to interpre-
tation, it may even urge contempt towards these individuals. Moreover, this is plausibly 
not an accidental feature of this campaign, for taking sexual assault as seriously as it de-
serves may require all of us to feel less empathy, and less respect, for those who hold the 
attitudes described above.
If all this is right, then the “Don’t be that guy” campaign is democratically acceptable 
propaganda even though it fails to satisfy Stanley’s conditions for civic rhetoric. That’s not 
to say that all propaganda should be considered acceptable in a democracy as long as it has 
some laudable goal (or effect): a sexual assault prevention campaign that relies on widely 
held racist stereotypes should not be acceptable, for example. Stanley, I think, is right on 
this point. Rather, my argument points to the need for a middle ground between this kind 
of overly permissive view, and what I’ve described as Stanley’s too high bar for civic rheto-
ric. What that middle ground should be I’ll leave as an open question here.
6. Conclusion
My discussion in this paper has touched on some interesting questions raised by Stanley’s 
provocative work; but as I suspect is clear at this point, there is a lot more to be said about 
all of these issues. In closing, I’ll briefly emphasize one theme that has run through my dis-
cussion, namely, the importance of emotion to the success of propagandistic representa-
tions. As I’ve tried to bring out (and as Stanley agrees), propaganda can rely on emotions 
to both negative and positive effect. Further discussion of both aspects —and especially 
of what marks the democratically acceptable uses of propaganda— would be particularly 
worthwhile.
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